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The law of the few refers to the following empirical phenomenon: in social groups a
very small subset of individuals invests in collecting information while the rest of the
group invests in forming connections with this select few. In many instances, there are
no observable diﬀerences in characteristics between those who invest in information
and those who invest in forming connections. This paper shows that the law of few
naturally emerges in environments with identical rational agents.
We develop a strategic game in which players have the opportunity to invest in col-
lecting information as well as in investing in bilateral connections with others. We ﬁnd
that every strict equilibrium of this game exhibits the ‘law of the few’. We also show
that this pattern of social diﬀerentiations is eﬃcient in some cases.
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11 Introduction
In their classic study, Katz and Lazersfeld (1955) found that in making purchase decisions
across a range of products, most individuals relied on the information they received from a
small group of other individuals. They called these few individuals, opinion leaders. We refer
to the phenomenon of a small subset of individuals collecting information while the rest of
the group invests in connections with this select few as the Law of the Few. Over the years,
a large body of research in diﬀerent subjects – which include political science, sociology,
and marketing – has conﬁrmed the generality of the ﬁndings of Katz and Lazersfeld (1955).1
Most of this literature, after conﬁrming the law of the few, has examined the individual
characteristics of opinion leaders and in many instances they found somewhat surprisingly
that there were no signiﬁcant observable diﬀerences between the opinion leaders and the rest.2
Of course, in these studies one cannot exclude that such patterns of social diﬀerentiations
are caused by the presence of unobservable heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we think it is worth
exploring whether the law of the few can be obtained in environments with identical rational
agents.
There are three key ingredients in social information gathering: individuals can choose how
much to invest in collecting information and how much to invest in forming connections,
there are costs to each of these activities, and there is no diﬀerence across individuals with
regard to these costs and the corresponding beneﬁts of information. The incentives to acquire
information and to form connections will naturally depend on the relative costs of doing so.
Moreover, there is also an issue of coordination: if no one else acquires any information then
a player may have no choice but to acquire information himself. The main result of the paper
is that these economic pressures together yield a clear cut prediction: if the costs of forming
links are lower than the costs of directly acquiring information then every strict equilibrium
1The classic paper in marketing is Feick and Price (1987); for more recent work see, e.g., Geisser and
Edison (2005), Wiedman, Walsh and Mitchel (2001), and Williams and Slama (1995). In political science
the classic work is Lazarsfeld et al. (1955); more recent papers are Beck et al (2002), Huckfeldt and Sprague
(1995).
2For example, Feick and Price (1987) showed that market mavens – individuals who are well deﬁned
across several product categories – are prominent and that their characteristics do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from other individuals who are not well informed. Geisser and Edison (2005), Wiedman, Walsh and Mitchel
(2001), and Williams and Slama (1995) arrive at similar conclusions.
1exhibits the law of the few: a small fraction of players acquire information directly while the
rest of the players invest in forming connections and only acquire information indirectly.
We now brieﬂy sketch the main arguments underlying this ﬁnding. In our model, the returns
from information are increasing and concave in total information received by a player, the
costs of acquiring information are linear in amount of information while the costs of forming
connections are linear in the number of connections. Under reasonable restrictions on the
marginal returns we get the property that on his own an individual will choose an interior
information level, say 1. This leads to our ﬁrst observation: in any equilibrium the total
information available to an individual must be at least 1. Moreover, if a player exerts any
eﬀort at all then the total information he gets must indeed be equal to 1. If the total
information was less than 1, then he gains by increasing eﬀort, since marginal returns are
larger than marginal cost. Similarly, if own eﬀort is positive but total information is greater
than 1, then the player can strictly increase payoﬀs by lowering eﬀort.
The second observation constitutes the key to the result: in every strict equilibrium, the sum
total of information directly acquired in a society is equal to 1. There are two steps in the
proof of this equilibrium property. The ﬁrst step shows that if any player chooses 1, then
it is optimal for everyone to choose 0 and simply link to this player. So let us consider an
equilibrium in which no player chooses 1. The second step shows that if two players choose
positive eﬀort and they are neighbors then they must have common neighbors in a strict
equilibrium.3
The basic idea underlying this proof is the following. Suppose i and j are neighbors, they
both choose positive eﬀort and l is a neighbor of i but not of player j. Suppose also that
player l chooses higher eﬀort than player j. To ﬁx ideas, ﬁgure 1 illustrates this conﬁguration.
In the ﬁgure an arrow starting from i and pointing at j signiﬁes that i sponsors the link
with j. Since i links with j then the costs of the link must be smaller than the costs of the
information that i accesses from j. Similarly, since player l is not a neighbor of j, it must be
the case that the costs of a link with j are higher than the costs of information that j has
3In a network, j and i are said to be neighbors if there is a direct link between them.
2acquired on his own. Together, this tells us that the costs of j’s information equal the costs
of a link. This makes player i indiﬀerent between keeping the link with j and substituting
the link with own additional eﬀort. Hence, this conﬁguration cannot be sustained in a strict
equilibrium. Similar considerations are obtained in other conﬁgurations between these three
players. Thus, this second step implies that all linked players choosing positive eﬀort share
the same neighbors and if aggregate eﬀort were higher than 1 this would contradict our ﬁrst
observation. Hence, in any strict equilibrium the aggregate information in the society must
be exactly 1.
The third observation is that every equilibrium network has the inter-linked stars architec-
ture. Figure 2 illustrates this architecture. Roughly speaking, an inter-linked stars architec-
ture contains a set of hub players (the black nodes in ﬁgure 2) who are linked to everyone
while every other player (the white nodes in ﬁgure 2) forms a link with each of the hubs.4 To
see how this comes about suppose that the number of players choosing to directly acquire
information is less than n. We know that in any strict equilibrium the total eﬀort is 1, and
that every player has at least 1 unit of information. It then follows that every positive eﬀort
player will form a link with every other positive eﬀort player, while the zero eﬀort players
will form a link with all the positive eﬀort players. Thus any equilibrium network will have
the inter-linked stars architecture.
The ﬁnal observation combines the above steps to derive the law of the few property for
every equilibrium. For any cost of acquiring information and any cost of forming link it
must be the case that if player i forms a connection with j then the cost of linking must be
less than the cost of providing the eﬀort accessed from j. This, however, gives us a lower
bound on the size of eﬀort of j. Since aggregate eﬀort is 1, the maximum number of players
who choose positive eﬀort is bounded above and is independent of the number of players.
This means that the fraction of players who choose positive eﬀort can be made arbitrarily
small by suitably raising the number of players, and the Law of the Few obtains.
We also study the social eﬃciency of diﬀerent patterns of eﬀorts and linking. We ﬁnd
4For a formal deﬁnition of this architecture, see section 2.
3that when the costs of forming links are low, then the star network in which the central
player acquires all the information is socially eﬃcient.5 The intuition for this result is that
if many individuals make investments in acquiring information then social eﬃciency also
entails the formation of several links among these players. Since links are costly and the
costs of information gathering is linear in eﬀort, concentrating all eﬀorts with one player
economizes on costs and yields the eﬃcient outcome. In contrast, if costs of forming links
are high, the socially eﬃcient outcome is characterized by each player acquiring information
and no player forms links. Comparing socially optimal outcomes with equilibrium outcomes
we can conclude that for low costs of linking in equilibrium players under-invest in eﬀort, for
moderate costs of linking in equilibrium there is under-investment and under-connectivity,
while if costs of linking are suﬃciently high then equilibria are socially eﬃcient.
Finally, we also study a discrete version of this model, which is called best shot game. Players
can only choose either to provide a unit of eﬀort at a cost c or not providing eﬀort at all.
A player gets 1 if he accesses at least a unit of eﬀort, otherwise the returns are 0.6 Here
we conﬁrm that if the costs of linking are lower than the costs of providing eﬀort in every
equilibrium the law of the few obtains. In contrast with the continuous model, in the discrete
model every equilibrium is socially eﬃcient.
The main contribution of our paper is to develop a simple model of strategic investments in
information collection and link formation which can address the empirical ﬁnding of the Law
of the Few. Our analysis shows that in settings with identical rational agents, a combination
of simple economic factors – the relative costs of acquiring information versus the costs of
forming links – and strategic interaction together provide a simple explanation for this law.
From a theoretical point of view, our paper is a contribution to the recent theory of net-
works. We develop a simple game in which individuals choose investments in information
acquisition as well as decide with whom to form connections with a view to accessing the
5The star architecture is a network in which there is one player, the hub, who is linked with all other
players, the spokes, and there are no other links. Figure 3 contains an example of this architecture.
6The best-shot game is a good metaphor for situations in which there are signiﬁcant externalities between
players’ eﬀort. For a discussion of best-shot games within the contexts of public good games see, e.g.,
Hirshleifer (1983) and Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989).
4information acquired by these individuals. Our model combines the approach to link for-
mation introduced in Bala ad Goyal (2000) with the approach to the study of local public
goods developed in Bramoulle and Kranton (2007).7 As the above discussion illustrates,
this combination yields a tractable framework and sharp predictions. A recent paper by
Cabrales, Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2007) also presents a model of private investments
and network formation. There are two key diﬀerences between our paper and their papers.
We have a model in which individuals decide on individual speciﬁc links while in their papers
investments in links are not individual speciﬁc. This implies that the strategy set of players
and the methods of analysis are completely diﬀerent. The second diﬀerence is that in their
models individuals are ex-ante diﬀerent, while in our paper the focus is on understanding
how signiﬁcant diﬀerentiation and the law of the few can arise in settings with identical
individuals.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model, while section
3 contains the main results. Section 4 considers two extensions. The ﬁrst extension studies
the eﬀect of richer patters of spill overs. The second extensions studies a best shot game.
Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains all the proofs.
2 Model
Let N = {1,2,..,n} with n ≥ 3 be the set of players and let i and j by typical members of
this set. Each player i chooses an eﬀort xi ∈ X and a set of links which is represented as a
(row) vector gi = (gi1,...,gii−1,gii+1,...,gin), where gij ∈ {0,1}, for each j ∈ N \{i}. We will
suppose that X ∈ [0,+∞). We say that player i has a link with player j if gij = 1. A link
between player i and j allows both players to access the eﬀort exerted by the other player.
The set of strategies of player i is denoted by Si = X × Gi. Deﬁne S = S1 × ... × Sn as the
set of strategies of all players. A strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) ∈ S speciﬁes the eﬀort of each
player, x = (x1,x2,...,xn), and the network of relations g = (g1,g2,...,gn).
7The literature on network formation and the literature on games played on ﬁxed networks are both
extensive and rich. For a survey of this work see Goyal (2007).
8In this paper, our interest is in situations where information sharing is a social activity; for a study of
situations in which players can charge prices for their information, see Cabrales and Gottardi (2007).
5The network of relations g is a directed graph; let G be the set of all possible directed graphs
on n vertices. Deﬁne Nd(i;g) = {j ∈ N : gij = 1} as the set of players with whom i has
formed a link. Let ηi(g) = |Nd(i;g)|.
The closure of g is a non-directed network denoted ¯ g = cl(g), where ¯ gij = max{gij,gj,i} for
each i and j in N. In words, the closure of a directed network simply means replacing every
directed edge of g by a non-directed one. Deﬁne N(i; ¯ g) = {j ∈ N : ¯ gij = 1} as the set of
players directly connected to i.








 − cxi − ηi(g)k, (1)
where c > 0 reﬂects the cost of eﬀort and k > 0 is the cost of linking with one other
person. We will assume that f(y) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing, and strictly
concave in y. To focus on interesting cases we will assume that f(0) = 0, f0(0) > c and
limy→∞f0(y) = z < c. Under these assumptions there exists a number ˆ y > 0 such that
ˆ y = argmaxy∈X f(y) − cy.
For any strategy proﬁle s, let s−i = (s1,...si−1,si+1,...,sn), be the strategies of all players







−i),∀si ∈ Si,∀i ∈ N.
An equilibrium is said to be strict if the inequalities in the above deﬁnition are strict for
every player.
We deﬁne social welfare to be the sum of individual payoﬀs. So that for any proﬁle s social





A proﬁle s∗ is socially eﬃcient if W(s∗) ≥ W(s), ∀s ∈ S.
6We say that there is a path in ¯ g between i and j if either ¯ gij = 1 or there exists players
j1,...,jm distinct from each other and i and j such that {¯ gij1 = ¯ gj1,j2 = ... = ¯ gin,jm = 1}.
Given a network ¯ g, we deﬁne a component as a set C(¯ g) ⊂ N such that ∀i,j ∈ C(¯ g) there
exists a path between them and there does not exist a path between ∀i ∈ C(¯ g) and a player
j ∈ N \ C(¯ g). A component C(¯ g) is non-singleton if |C(¯ g)| > 1. A player i is isolated if
¯ gij = 0, ∀j ∈ N. Let m(¯ g) be the number of components of ¯ g; we say that a network ¯ g is
minimal if m(¯ g−¯ gij) > m(¯ g), for every link ¯ gij = 1 in ¯ g, where ¯ g−¯ gij is a network obtained
starting from ¯ g and deleting a link ¯ gij. A network ¯ g is minimally connected if it is composed
of only one component and it is minimal.
A network g is an inter-linked stars network if there are some players who are linked to
everyone while the rest of the players only form links with these players. Formally in an
inter-linked stars network there are two groups of players, N1(¯ g) and N2(¯ g), with the feature
that Ni(¯ g) = N2(¯ g) for i ∈ N1(¯ g) and Nj(¯ g) = N\{i}, for all j ∈ N2(¯ g). The star a special
case of this architecture, in which |N2(¯ g)| = 1 and |N1(¯ g)| = n − 1. In an inter-linked star
network, nodes which have n − 1 links are referred to as central nodes or as hubs, while
the complementary set of nodes are referred to as peripheral nodes or as spokes. Figure
3 illustrates inter-linked stars networks. In the ﬁgure there are n = 8 players; in each
architecture the black nodes are the hubs (the set N1), while the white nodes are the spokes
(the set N2).
3 Analysis
The focus of our analysis will be on the distribution of eﬀort and linking activity across
players in strict equilibria. Our main result has three parts. First, we show that if costs of
linking are smaller than the costs of eﬀort that a player would provide on his own, say ˆ y,
then in equilibrium the aggregate social eﬀort will be equal to ˆ y, irrespective of the number
of players. Second, we show that the inter-linked stars network is the unique equilibrium
architecture. In this network every player who exerts a positive eﬀort is a hub, while the no
eﬀort players are the spokes. Third, the set of hub players is very small relative the total
7number of players, i.e., the law of the few obtains.
Given any equilibrium s = (x,g), deﬁne I(s) = {i ∈ N|xi > 0} as the set of players who
choose a positive eﬀort.




i = ˆ y. Every strict equilibrium has the interlinked stars architecture
and hub players exert positive eﬀorts while the spokes choose zero eﬀort. Finally, for given
c and k, with k < cˆ y, in any strict equilibrium s∗ the ratio |I(s∗)|/n can be made arbitrarily
close to 0 by raising n. If k > cˆ y then there exists a unique equilibrium: every player exerts
eﬀort ˆ y and no one forms any links.
We now brieﬂy sketch the main arguments underlying the proof of this result. The focus
will be on the case where k < cˆ y. Deﬁne yi = xi +
P
j∈Ni(¯ g) xj. The ﬁrst step in the proof
exploits the assumption that f(0) = 0, f0(0) > c and limy→∞ f0(y) < c, to show that in every
equilibrium yi ≥ ˆ y and if xi > 0 then yi = ˆ y. Note that if yi < ˆ y, then a player gains by
increasing eﬀort, since marginal returns are larger than marginal cost. Similarly, if xi > 0
and yi > ˆ y, then player i can strictly increase payoﬀs by lowering eﬀort.
The key step in the proof shows that in any strict equilibrium
P
i∈N xi = ˆ y. This relies in
the following equilibrium properties: in any strict equilibrium every linked pair of positive
eﬀort players must share the same neighbors. To see the intuition underlying this suppose
that i and j exert some positive eﬀorts and that gij = 1. Suppose also that xi ≤ xj and
that player i has a neighbor, say l, who is not linked with j. Figure 1 illustrates a possible
conﬁguration between these three players.
First note that since xi ≤ xj then gli = 0, otherwise player j would weakly gain by switching
the link from player i to player j. Hence, gil = 1; this immediately implies that the costs of
a link sponsored to l are suﬃciently low, namely k < cxl. The fact that k < cxl also implies
that the eﬀort of player j must be strictly less than the eﬀort of player l, i.e., xj < xl. Indeed,
if j were providing higher eﬀort than l, then, since k < cxl, player j would strictly gain by
forming an additional link with player l and reducing his own eﬀort to xj − xl.
8However, given that xj < xl, then l may have an incentive to form a link with j and reducing
his own eﬀort to xl −xj. This is not proﬁtable only if the eﬀort provided by j is suﬃciently
low, namely k > cxj. But note that in this case j must have sponsored a link to i and since
j is not linked to l then i must exert strictly higher eﬀort than l, xi > xl. Since the eﬀort of
player j is lower than the eﬀort of l, we conclude that the eﬀort of i is strictly higher than
the eﬀort of j, which is in contradiction with the initial hypothesis. This proves that every
neighbor of i must also be a neighbor of j. The reverse then follows by noting that if j were
accessing the eﬀort of some player not in the neighbor of i, then player j would access from
his own neighbor strictly more eﬀort than what player i would access from his own neighbor,
but then player j should provide less eﬀort than player i, which is in contradiction with our
initial hypothesis.
It is then clear that since every linked pair of players i,j ∈ I(s) share the same neighbors,
the players in I(s) constitute a clique and this implies that the total eﬀort must equal ˆ y.
The third step in the proof shows that if
P
i∈N xi = ˆ y then an equilibrium network has the
inter-linked stars architecture. To see why this is true, let us focus on the case |I(s)| < n.
Since in any strict equilibrium
P
i∈N xi = ˆ y, it follows that for every pair of players i,j ∈ I(s),
¯ gij = 1. Since k > 0, for every i ∈ N, and for every l / ∈ I(s), gil = 0. Thus, for every l / ∈ I(s),
since xl = 0 it must be the case that and gli = 1 for all i ∈ I(s). This establishes the required
architecture of strict equilibrium networks.
The last step in the proof derives the law of the few property for every equilibrium. For any
c and k it must be the case that if i links with j then the cost of link must be less than the
cost of providing the eﬀort accessed from j, in other words cxj > k. This, however, gives us
a lower bound of k/c on the eﬀort of j. Since total eﬀort in equilibrium is ˆ y, it follows that
the maximum value of |I(s)| is bounded above by (ˆ yc)/k. This number is independent of n,
and so it follows that for any equilibrium, the ratio |I(s)|/n can be made arbitrarily small
by suitably raising n.
Theorem 3.1 obtains the law of the few, for large n. What can we say about number of
players who exert eﬀort for ﬁxed n? The following result addresses this issue.
9Proposition 3.1 Suppose payoﬀs are given by (1). If k < ˆ yc, then there exists an equilib-
rium in which the network is a star, the hub player exerts eﬀort ˆ y, all the other players exert
eﬀort 0 and each forms a link with the hub player. Moreover, if k
ˆ y ∈ (c/2,c) then this is the
unique strict equilibrium outcome.
If all players choose zero eﬀort and link with player i, then it is clearly a best response
for player i to choose ˆ y. For a spoke player the payoﬀ is f(ˆ y) − k. Exerting eﬀort while
maintaining the link is not proﬁtable under the assumptions on f(.). Deleting the link is
not proﬁtable since k < ˆ yc. Next note from Theorem 3.1 that every strict equilibrium is an
inter-linked star with every player who exerts eﬀort being a hub. However, if k > ˆ yc/2 then
a link is only proﬁtable if a player chooses eﬀort xi > ˆ y/2. Since sum of eﬀorts is equal to ˆ y,
in equilibrium at most one player can exert eﬀort.
We now turn to the social welfare of equilibrium networks. We ﬁrst observe that if k < ˆ yc
then in any strict equilibrium the sum of total eﬀort is ˆ y, each player accesses exactly ˆ y
units of eﬀort, but the number of links vary. Given the linearity of costs of eﬀort as well
as the costs of linking it then follows that these equilibria can be ranked by the number
of links they contain. In particular, since the star minimizes the number of links, it is the
most eﬃcient equilibrium. The second observation is that in every equilibrium, every player
must access ˆ y of eﬀort. This observation follows from Proposition 5.1 which is presented in
the appendix. In that proposition we provide a partial characterization of all equilibria in
this game. Since every player must access eﬀort ˆ y in every equilibrium, it follows that in
every equilibrium the aggregate gross returns are nf(ˆ y). The most eﬃcient equilibrium will
clearly minimizes the total costs of eﬀort and total costs of forming links, which immediately
leads to the star architecture where the hub provides all the eﬀort. These observations are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 Suppose payoﬀs are given by (1). If k < ˆ yc, then the strict equilibria can
be ranked by the number of links they contain. Furthermore, the eﬃcient equilibrium is a
star where the hub provides eﬀort ˆ y, every spoke provides eﬀort 0 and forms a link with the
hub.
10However, it is clear that an equilibrium will not be socially eﬃcient in general. To see this
note that in the star, the hub player chooses eﬀort ˆ y, and at this point f0(ˆ y) = c. But
marginal social returns are given by nf0(ˆ y), which is certainly larger than c, for n ≥ 2.
Hence, all equilibria are ineﬃcient if k < ˆ yc. This is an implication of the public good
nature of individual eﬀort. So long as equilibrium entails any links, it will also imply an
under provision of eﬀort relative to the social optimum.
The following proposition characterizes eﬃcient outcomes.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose payoﬀs are given by (1). For every c, there exists a ¯ k > cˆ y such
that if k < ¯ k then the socially optimal outcome is a star network in which the hub chooses
eﬀort ˜ y such that nf0(˜ y) = c, while all other players choose eﬀort 0. If k > ¯ k, then in the
socially optimal outcome every player chooses eﬀort ˆ y and no one forms links.
The value of ¯ k is obtained by equating the social welfare attained by the two conﬁgurations
presented in Proposition 3.3 and it is formally derived in the appendix. To illustrate more
in details the trade-oﬀ between equilibrium and eﬃciency, consider the following example.
Suppose c = 1/2 and f(y) = ln(1 + y). In this case ˆ y = 1, while ˜ y = 2n − 1. In ﬁgure 4
we plot ¯ k as a function of the number of players. For a given n there are three regions. For
low costs of linking, k < 1/2, the most eﬃcient equilibrium is a star where the hub provides
eﬀort 1 and the spokes choose 0. As compared to socially optimal outcomes, in equilibrium
there is under investment. For moderate costs of linking, k ∈ (1/2,¯ k), in equilibrium we
have under investment and under connectivity relative to socially optimal outcomes. In the
remaining region equilibrium outcomes coincide with socially optimal outcomes.
4 Extensions
In this section we consider two extensions of the model presented in Section 2. The ﬁrst
extension studies a situation in which the eﬀort provided by a player may spill over along
links in the network. The second extension considers a model in which eﬀort is a discrete
choice.
114.1 General Decay Model
The model in section 2 assumes that the eﬀorts of players only spill over on direct neighbors.
A more general model is one where eﬀorts spill over along links and the intensity of these
synergies depends on the distance in the network between players. We now extend the model
presented in section 2 to allow for a richer patterns of eﬀort’s externalities.9
Given two players i and j in g, the geodesic distance, d(i,j; ¯ g), is deﬁned as the length of
the shortest path between i and j in ¯ g. If not such path exists, the distance is set to inﬁnity.
Let Nl(i; ¯ g) = {j ∈ N : d(i,j; ¯ g) = l}, that is Nl(i; ¯ g) is the set of players who are at ﬁnite
distance l from i in ¯ g. For a strategy s = (x,g) the total amount of eﬀorts that player i




j∈Nl(i;¯ g) alxj, where a1,a2,...,an−1 are weights measuring
the intensity of spill overs at diﬀerent distances. We shall assume that al ∈ [0,1] for all
l = 1,...,n − 1 and that a1 ≥ a2 ≥ ... ≥ an−1; this last assumption signiﬁes that spill overs
are decreasing in the geodesic distance.
The payoﬀs to player i under strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) can be rewritten as follows,
Πi(s) = f(yi) − cxi − ηi(g)k, (3)
and the assumptions on c, k and f(·) are the same as in section 2. Note that the model in
section 2 is obtained by setting a1 = 1 and al = 0 for all l > 1.
The following proposition provides some preliminary results on the eﬀect of allowing spill
overs along links.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose payoﬀs are given by (3).
I Suppose al = 1 for all l = 1....,n − 1. If k < cˆ y then s = (x,g) is an equilibrium if
and only if (a) aggregate eﬀort equals ˆ y, (b) ¯ g is minimally connected and (c) if gij = 1
then k ≥ cyj. Moreover, the star where the hub chooses ˆ y, every spoke chooses 0 and
forms a link with the hub is always an equilibrium.
9We model spill overs following Hojman and Szeidl (2006).
12II Suppose a1 = 1 > a2. If k < cˆ y, then there exists a strict equilibrium in which the
network is a star, the hub chooses ˆ y, every spoke chooses 0 and forms a link with the
hub.
Part I of Proposition 4.1 covers the extreme situation in which eﬀorts perfectly spill over
along links. In this case it is clear that in every equilibrium the aggregate eﬀort must equal
the eﬀort that a player would provide on his own and that the network must be connected
and minimal. Equilibrium condition (c) says that not every minimally connected network
may be part of an equilibrium. Indeed, it must be the case that if the costs of a link, say
from i to j, must be lower than the eﬀort that i accesses via j. This implies that either player
j provides enough eﬀort on his own, or that player j allows i to access the eﬀort provided by
other players. This suggests that when the costs of a link are suﬃciently high (suﬃciently
closed to cˆ y), then even if in equilibrium there may be many players who provide eﬀorts, only
few players provide most of the total eﬀort collected in the group. The following example
illustrates this idea.
Consider a star architecture with 4 spokes and suppose that the hub chooses 0 and each
spokes choose ˆ y/4. First, suppose also that the hub forms a link with each spoke. Clearly, if
k > ˆ y/4 this conﬁguration cannot be an equilibrium. Second, consider now that every spoke
forms a link with the hub. In this case, even if the hub does not provide eﬀort, he allows
each hub to access 3ˆ y/4 units of eﬀort. Clearly, if k ≤ 3cˆ y/4 this conﬁguration cannot be
part of an equilibrium. In contrast, note that if the hub provides all the eﬀort then this is
always an equilibrium.
Finally, Part II of Proposition 4.1 covers the case in which the eﬀort accessed from direct
neighbors is as valuable as own eﬀort, while the eﬀort accessed from non-neighbors players
is less valuable. In this case the star architecture where only the hub invests in eﬀort is
always a strict equilibrium. It is also possible to check that inter-linked stars are equilibria
for appropriately chosen levels of costs of linking and eﬀort.
134.2 The Best Shot Game
In this section we study a model similar to the model presented in section 2, but where
a player can either acquire information at a cost c or he does not provide eﬀort at all, i.e.
X = {0,1}. We assume that the returns to a player from acquiring information are f(yi) = 1
if yi ≥ 1, otherwise f(yi) = 0, where recall that yi = xi +
P
j∈N(i;¯ g) xj. We assume that
c < 1. This speciﬁcation resembles the best shot game which has been widely studied in
economics.10 The following proposition characterizes the equilibria in the best shot game.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose X = {0,1}. If k < c then every equilibrium has a star architec-
ture, the hub chooses 1, every spoke chooses 0 and forms a link with the hub. If k > c then
there exists a unique equilibrium: every player chooses 1 and no one forms any links.
The proof of this proposition relies on the observation that if k < c then only one player
can provide eﬀort. Suppose, on the contrary, that players i and j provide eﬀort. If they
are neighbors, then player i would strictly gain by choosing eﬀort 0. This implies that each
player belonging to i’s neighbor does not provide eﬀort. But then player i would strictly
gain by choosing eﬀort 0 and linking up with player j.
There are two remarks we would like to emphasize. First, Proposition 4.2 shows that even
if players can choose a discrete amount of eﬀort the law of the few obtains. We note that
this is true in a more general model where the returns to a player are: f(y) = 1 if y ≥ z,
otherwise 0, z ≥ 1. When z > 1 this speciﬁcation is reminiscent of the weakest link model
studied within the contexts of public good games by, among others, Harrison and Hirshleifer
(1989). Note that if z > 1, then the eﬀorts of players are complements if y < z, while strict
substitutes if y ≥ z. In this model, for low costs of linking, in every equilibrium the sum
of total eﬀorts would be z and every equilibrium has the inter-linked stars architecture, hub
players choose 1 and every spoke chooses 0.11
10The best-shot game is a good metaphor for situations in which there are signiﬁcant externalities between
players’ eﬀort. For a discussion of best-shot games within the contexts of public good games see, e.g.,
Hirshleifer (1983) and Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989).
11A full characterization of this “weakest-link“ public good model is available from the authors upon
requests.
14The second remark is that in this model every equilibrium is eﬃcient. This is in sharp
contrast with the case in which eﬀort is a continuous variable.
Proposition 4.3 Suppose X{0,1}. If k < c, then the socially optimal outcome is a star
network, the hub chooses 1 and every spoke chooses 0. If k > c, then in the socially optimal
outcome every player chooses 1 and no one forms links.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have deﬁned the law of the few as the empirical phenomenon of a small subset of in-
dividuals collecting information while the rest of the group invests in connections with this
select few. The main contribution of our paper is to develop a simple model of strategic
investments in information collection and link formation in which the law of the few emerges
as an equilibrium outcome with identical rational players. We also studies the eﬃciency
properties of these patterns of social diﬀerentiation.
From a theoretical point of view, our paper combines the approach of link formation in-
troduced in Bala and Goyal (2000) with the approach to the study of network games with
strategic substitutes developed in Bramoulle and Kranton (2007). On the one hand, the
main drawback of the existing literature on strategic network formation is that the beneﬁts
that players obtained when belonging to a certain network are primitives of the model. That
is, the architecture of the network inﬂuences with whom a player would like to link up, but it
does not inﬂuence other decision variables, such as provision of eﬀort, collecting information
and alike, which naturally also determine the value of the network. On the other hand, the
existing literature on network games assumes that the network of relations is given and fo-
cuses on how the location of a player in the network aﬀects his behavior. In many instances,
both dimensions are endogenous: individuals form connections with others depending on
their behavior and the behavior of individuals depends on the social network. This paper
shows that the combination of these two approaches yields a tractable framework and sharp
predictions.
Before concluding we would like to make a remark on the implications of our results for
15the design of prevention policies interventions. Many social programmes attempt to create
awareness among individuals about diﬀerent risk behavior that can lead, for example, to
sexually transmitted disease. Our analysis suggests that the data collection of interpersonal
communication networks of a community is key to design eﬀective prevention policies inter-
ventions.12 As a very simple illustration suppose that a government realizes that a particular
community lacks information on how to prevent the transmission of a particular diseas. Sup-
pose that the policy of the government is to contact and inform 1 individual with the hope
that the information will spread among other community members. Without knowledge of
the network, the government will choose the individual randomly and for a large community
almost surely that individual will not be an opinion leader. In this case every dollar that
the government spends to inform the individual will only spill over to a small subsets of the
community. On the other hand, by collecting information about the communication network,
for example by asking a subset of the community members to report “with whom they talk
to” about a particular matter, the government can identify an opinion leader, the individual
who receives most nominations. Each dollar spent on this opinion leader will then spill over
to all community members.
12For example, in a recent report of the World Bank “The Africa Multi-Country AIDS Programm 2000-
2006” there are many examples of eﬀective prevention social programmes based on interpersonal communi-
cation networks. See also Valente et al. (2003) and Kelly et al. (1991) for a discussion about the empirical
importance of prevention policies intervention which incorporate information on social networks.
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This appendix provides proofs of the results in section 3. We also provides Proposition
5.1 which provides a partial characterization of Nash equilibria. We star with the proof
of Theorem 3.1. This proof consists of a number of steps and it is useful to present it
as a sequence of lemmas. The ﬁrst step in the proof obtains a general property of every
equilibrium conﬁguration. For a strategy proﬁle s = (x,g), deﬁne, with some abuse of
notation, yi = xi +
P
j∈N(i;¯ g) xj as the total eﬀort accessible to player i. Recall that ˆ y =
argmaxy∈X f(y) − cy.
Lemma 5.1 In any equilibrium s = (x,g), yi ≥ ˆ y, for all i ∈ N. Moreover, if xi > 0 then
yi = ˆ y.
Proof: Suppose not and yi < ˆ y for some i in equilibrium. Under the maintained assumptions
f0(yi) > c and so player i can strictly increase his payoﬀs by increasing eﬀort. Next suppose
that xi > 0 and yi > ˆ y. Under our assumptions on f(.) and c, if yi > ˆ y then f0(yi) < c; but
then i can strictly increase payoﬀs by lowering eﬀort. This completes the proof. 
If a player chooses xi = ˆ y and k < cˆ y then this leads to a specially simple equilibrium proﬁle.
The following lemma clariﬁes this point.
Lemma 5.2 Suppose k < cˆ y. In any equilibrium s = (x,g), if xi = ˆ y, then xj = 0, for all
j 6= i.
Proof: Suppose that s = (x,g) is an equilibrium in which xi = ˆ y and there is xj > 0, for
some j 6= i. First, since xi > 0, it follows from Lemma 5.1 that yi = ˆ y. This also implies
that every player in the neighbor of i must exert eﬀort 0. Now consider j, with xj > 0. This
means that ¯ gij = 0. It follows from Lemma 5.1 that yj = ˆ y. If xj = ˆ y then this player must
get payoﬀ f(ˆ y) − cˆ y. If he switched to a link with i and reduced eﬀort to 0, his payoﬀ is
f(ˆ y) − k. Since k < cˆ y, xj = ˆ y is clearly not an optimal strategy for player j. So s is not
an equilibrium. Next suppose that xj < ˆ y. From Lemma 5.1 we know that in equilibrium
yj = ˆ y, and so there there is some player l 6= i such that ¯ gjl = 1 and xl ∈ (0, ˆ y). It is clear
17that if gjl = 1 then player j can strictly increase payoﬀ by switching the link from l to i.
Similarly, if glj = 1, then player l gains strictly by switching link from j to i. So s cannot
be an equilibrium. A contradiction which completes the proof. 
Lemma 5.2 implies that, for given k < cˆ y, if some player chooses ˆ y, then in any equilibrium
aggregate eﬀort is ˆ y. We now turn to equilibria in which no player chooses ˆ y. We show that
in any strict equilibrium aggregate eﬀort is also equal to ˆ y. This is the key step in the proof
of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 5.3 Suppose k < cˆ y. In every strict equilibrium s = (x,g),
P
i∈N xi = ˆ y.
Proof: In view of Lemma 5.2 we can focus on the case where no player chooses ˆ y. Recall
that I(s) is the set of players who choose positive eﬀort in equilibrium s. We now show that
if two players belonging to I(s), say i and j, are linked, then every player in the neighbor of
i who exerts positive eﬀort also belongs to the neighboor of j, and vice versa.
Claim 1. Suppose s is a strict equilibrium. Let i,j ∈ I(s) and ¯ gij = 1. Then, for every
l ∈ I(s) \ {i,j}, l ∈ N(i; ¯ g) if and only if l ∈ N(j; ¯ g).
Proof Claim 1. Let ¯ gi,j = 1, i,j ∈ I(s), and suppose, without loss of generality, that
xi ≤ xj. We ﬁrst prove that for every l ∈ I(s) \ {i,j}, if l ∈ N(i; ¯ g) then l ∈ N(j; ¯ g).
Suppose not and there exists a player l ∈ I(s), with l ∈ N(i; ¯ g) and l / ∈ N(j; ¯ g). If gli = 1,
then, since xi ≤ xj, l (weakly) gains by switching the link from i to j. Hence, let gil = 1.
Since xi > 0, it follows from Lemma 5.1 that yi = ˆ y and the payoﬀs to i in equilibrium s
are f(ˆ y) − cxi − ηi(g)k. Suppose that i deletes the link with player l and choose an eﬀort
˜ xi = xi + xl, then he obtains payoﬀs f(ˆ y) − cxi − cxl − (ηi(g) − 1)k. Since s is a strict
equilibrium this deviation strictly decreases i’s payoﬀs, which requires that k < cxl. Let
k < cxl and consider the following two possibilities.
(I:) xj ≥ xl. In this case, since ¯ gjl = 0, and since s is a strict equilibrium, player j must
strictly loose if he forms and additional link with l and choose eﬀorts ˜ xj = xj − xl. That is,
f(ˆ y) − cxj − ηj(g)k > f(ˆ y) − c(xj − xl) − (ηj(g) + 1)k, which holds if and only if k > cxl;
but this contradicts that k < cxl.
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costs for i to link with j are strictly lower than the costs of eﬀort that i accesses from j,
i.e., k < cxj. Since k < cxj, ¯ glj = 0 and, by assumption, xl > xj, then l strictly gains if he
links with j and chooses eﬀort ˜ xl = xl − xj. So s is not a strict equilibrium. (IIb:) Suppose
gji = 1. Since j does no access l but he sponsors a link to i, it follows that xi > xl. Since,
by assumption, xj < xl, it follows that xi > xl > xj, which contradicts that xi ≤ xj. We
have then shown that for every l ∈ I(s) \ {i,j}, if l ∈ N(i; ¯ g) then l ∈ N(j; ¯ g).
We now show that if l ∈ I(s) \ {i,j} and l ∈ N(j; ¯ g) then l ∈ N(i; ¯ g). Suppose not; then
player j accesses all positive eﬀort players that i accesses plus some other positive eﬀort
players. But this would contradict that xi ≤ xj. This concludes the proof of Claim 1. 
It is now easy to complete the proof of Lemma 5.3. Consider the subgraph of g deﬁned on
players belonging to I(s). If this subgraph is connected, then Claim 1 implies that it is a
clique. In this case Lamma 5.3 immediately follows from Lemma 5.1. Next, suppose this
subgraph is not connected and let C1 and C2 be two components. Claim 1 implies that each
component is a clique and, from Lemma 5.1, the total eﬀort in each component is ˆ y. Let
i,i0 ∈ C1 and j,j0 ∈ C2 with gi,i0 = 1 and gj,j0 = 1. Suppose, without loss of generality, that
x0
i ≤ x0
j; note that player i (weakly) gains by switching link from i0 to j0, a contradiction
with the hypothesis that s is a strict equilibrium. This concludes the proof of Lemma 5.3.

We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We ﬁrst consider the case k < cˆ y. From Lemma 5.3 we know
that aggregate eﬀort in any strict equilibrium is equal to ˆ y. We now take up the issue of
architecture. Suppose that s = (x,g) is a strict equilibrium and it is not an inter-linked
stars network. Clearly then there is no player i such that xi = ˆ y; for if there were such a
player then from Lemma 5.2 the equilibrium network would be a star. Since
P
i∈N xi = ˆ y, it
follows that for all i,j ∈ I(s), ¯ gij = 1. If |I(s)| = n, the claim follows. Suppose |I(s)| < n;
since k > 0, for every i ∈ N, and for every l / ∈ I(s), gil = 0. Thus, for every l / ∈ I(s), gl,i = 1
19for all i ∈ I(s). This proves that every strict equilibrium network has the inter-linked stars
architecture.
We now consider the proportion I(s)/n. Fix c and k. Consider ﬁrst a strict equilibrium
in which there is some player j / ∈ I(s). In such an equilibrium j forms a link with every
i ∈ I(s). For a player j to link to i, it must be true that cxi > k. This means that xi > k/c
for every i ∈ I(s) and so the maximum number of players who can contribute is given by
(ˆ yc)/k. Clearly, for given c and k, the ratio (ˆ yc)/nk can be made arbitrarily small by suitably
increasing n. Now consider an equilibrium in which |I(s)| = n. Note that for any i ∈ I(s),
if there is some j ∈ N such that gji = 1 then cxi > k. So the number of players who will
have incoming links is bounded above by (ˆ yc)/nk, as before. The rest of the players will
have no in-coming links but since |I(s)| = n, and
P
i∈N xi = ˆ y, it follows that yi < ˆ y, for all
i ∈ N. This contradicts Lemma 5.1 and so |I(s)| = n is not possible in a strict equilibrium,
for large n.
We ﬁnally consider the case k > cˆ y. In any equilibrium s = (x,g), xi ≤ ˆ y, for all i ∈ N.
But this means that if k > cˆ y(c) then no player will form a link in equilibrium. Under
our assumptions on f(·), it now follows that in equilibrium xi = ˆ y, for every i ∈ N. This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.1. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: First we show that a star network in which the hub exerts
eﬀort ˆ y and all other players exert 0 eﬀort but each forms a single link with the hub is an
equilibrium. Suppose that xi = ˆ y for some i ∈ N. The payoﬀ to player i is f(ˆ y)−c > 0. All
players are linked with him, so forming links is clearly not proﬁtable. A lowering of eﬀort
lowers payoﬀ since f(.) is strictly concave and f0(ˆ y) = c. Consider a player j 6= i. His payoﬀ
is f(ˆ y) − k. A possible deviation is to retain the link and increase eﬀort, but this is not
proﬁtable since f0(ˆ y) = c and f(·) is strictly concave. Linking with a player l 6= i is clearly
not proﬁtable since this player chooses eﬀort 0. The only other alternative is to delete the
link with player i and increase eﬀort. The optimal eﬀort level with zero links is xj = ˆ y, but
then the payoﬀ is f(ˆ y)−cˆ y. Since k < cˆ y, this is less than the payoﬀ f(ˆ y)−k, which player
j obtains in the stipulated proﬁle.
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We know from Lemma 5.3 that
P
i∈I(s) xi = ˆ y. Suppose |I(s)| ≥ 2. Then from Theorem
3.1 we know that ¯ gij = 1, for every pair i,j ∈ I(s). But gij = 1 implies that cxj > k,
and under the hypothesis k > (ˆ yc)/2 this means that xj > ˆ y(c)/2. There are two possible
situations: one, I(s) = n and two, |I(s)| < n. In the former case, there are n(n − 1)/2 links
and n(n − 1)/2 × ˆ y(c)/2 > ˆ y, for all n ≥ 3; from Lemma 5.3 this contradicts the hypothesis
that s is a strict equilibrium. Finally, if |I(s)| < n, then every player in I(s) is linked to by
every player outside I(s). However then
P
i∈I(s) xi > (|I(s)|ˆ y)/2 ≥ ˆ y so long as |I(s)| ≥ 2;
from Lemma 5.3 this contradicts the hypothesis that s is a strict equilibrium. Thus the only
possible equilibrium involves |I(s)| = 1. The result now follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
Suppose k < cˆ y. First consider strict equilibria. From Theorem 3.1 it follows that the
sum of total eﬀorts is ˆ y, that yi = ˆ y for all i ∈ N and that g has an inter-linked stars
architecture. Given the linearity of costs of eﬀort as well as the costs of linking, it follows
that the most eﬃcient strict equilibrium is the star. Let s∗ be such conﬁguration, then
SW(s∗) = nf(ˆ y) − cˆ y − (n − 1)k.
We now show that the social welfare of every nonstrict Nash equilibrium is strictly lower that
SW(s∗). Suppose s = (x,g) is a nonstrict Nash equilibrium. From Proposition 5.1 we know
that yi = ˆ y for all i ∈ N and that
P
i∈N xi > ˆ y. If g is connected, then there are at least
n − 1 links and therefore the proof follows. Suppose g is not connected and suppose there
are p components. Let C1(g) be a component of g. Since s is a nonstrict equilibrium then
yi = ˆ y for all i ∈ C1(g) and
P
i∈C1(g) xi ≥ ˆ y. Also, the number of links in C1(g) is at least
m ≥ |C1(g)|−1. So the sum of players’ payoﬀs in C1(g) is |C1(g)|f(ˆ y)−c
P
i∈C1(g) xi −mk.
This is (weakly) lower than a proﬁle in which C1(g) is a star, the hub chooses ˆ y and all the
spokes choose 0. So, SW(s) ≤ nf(ˆ y) − cpˆ y − (n − p)k < SW(s∗). This concludes the proof
of Proposition 3.2 
Proof of Proposition 3.3: Suppose s = (x,g) corresponds to an eﬃcient proﬁle. We ﬁrst
show that if g is not empty, then g is a star. Let g be a not empty network and suppose
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x is the total eﬀort exerted in component C. Then it follows that the total payoﬀ of all
players in component C is at most |C|f(x) − cx − (|C| − 1)k. Consider a star network with
|C| players in which the hub player alone exerts eﬀort equal to x. It then follows that this
conﬁguration attains the maximum possible aggregate payoﬀ given eﬀort x. Moreover, note
that aggregate payoﬀ in any proﬁle s, in which two or more players exert eﬀort is strictly
less than this, since it will entail the same total costs of eﬀort but a strictly higher cost of
linking or a strictly lower payoﬀ to at least one of the players. So the star network with the
hub exerting eﬀort is the optimal proﬁle for each component.
Next consider two or more components in an eﬃcient proﬁle s. It is easy to see that in a
component of size m, eﬃciency dictates that eﬀort x satisfy mf0(x) = c. If the components
are of unequal size then eﬀorts will be unequal and a simple switching of spoke players across
components raises social welfare. So in any eﬃcient proﬁle with two or more components, the
components must be of equal size. Let m be the size and let the eﬀort x satisfy mf0(x) = c.
Suppose next that the network contains two components C1 and C2 of size m. Consider the
network in which the spoke players in component 2 are all switched to component 1. This
yields a network g0 with components C0
1 and C0
2 with the former containing 2m − 1 players
while the latter contains 1 player. Then the payoﬀ remains unchanged. However, the eﬀort
level x is no longer optimal in either of the components. So, for instance, eﬀort can be lowered
in component 2 and the aggregate payoﬀ thereby strictly increased, under the assumptions
on f(·). A similar argument also applies to networks with three or more components, and so
we have proved that no proﬁle with two or more components can be eﬃcient. Thus, if g is
not empty then g is a star and the eﬀort of the central player is ˜ y = argmaxy∈X nf(y)−cy.
The social welfare associated to such proﬁle is: SW = nf(˜ y) − c˜ y − (n − 1)k.
Finally, note that if s is socially eﬃcient and g is not a star, then g must be empty and
every player will choose ˆ y. The social welfare is then SW = n[f(ˆ y) − cˆ y]. The expression
of ¯ k is obtained by equating the social welfare in these two conﬁgurations, i.e. (n − 1)¯ k =
n[f(˜ y) − f(ˆ y)] + c[(n − 1)ˆ y − ˜ y] + cˆ y. To see that ¯ k > cˆ y, note that if ¯ k ≤ cˆ y, then
22n[f(˜ y) − f(ˆ y)] + c[(n − 1)ˆ y − ˜ y] + cˆ y ≤ (n − 1)cˆ y, which holds if and only if nf(˜ y) − c˜ y ≤
nf(ˆ y)−cˆ y. Given that ˜ y = argmaxy∈X nf(y)−cy, ˆ y = argmaxy∈X f(y)−cy and that f(·) is
strictly concave, the above inequality cannot hold. This concludes the proof of Proposition
3.3. 
The following proposition provides a partial characterization of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose k < cˆ y and let s = (x,g) be an equilibrium. If
P
i∈N xi = ˆ y then
g is an inter-linked stars, hubs choose positive eﬀorts and every spoke chooses eﬀort 0. If
P
i∈N xi > ˆ y there are two possibilities:
I Every player i ∈ I(s) has ∆ ∈ {1,...,n − 2} links with positive eﬀort players and
chooses eﬀort xi =
ˆ y
∆+1 = k
c, while every other player has ∆ + 1 links with positive
eﬀort players and there are not other links.
II Every player chooses positive eﬀorts and there are two types of players. High eﬀort
players choose ¯ x = k
c, while every low eﬀort player has η links with high eﬀort players,
they are not neighbors of each other and choose eﬀort x = ˆ y−η k
c, where
ˆ yc
k −1 < η <
ˆ yc
k .
Proof of Proposition 5.1:
First suppose that
P
i∈N xi = ˆ y. In this case it is clear that I(s) must be a clique. Further-
more, ¯ gi,j = 0 for all j / ∈ I(s). Therefore, each player choosing 0 eﬀort must sponsor a link
with every positive eﬀort players.
Hereafter, let s = (x,g) be an equilibrium where
P
i∈N xi > ˆ y. The proof now consists of
two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we characterize equilibria in which positive eﬀort players choose
the same eﬀort. In the second step we consider situations in which positive eﬀort players
choose diﬀerent level of eﬀorts.
Step 1. We prove that if all positive eﬀort players choose the same level of eﬀort then s
satisﬁes Part I of Proposition 5.1. Suppose xi = x, ∀i ∈ I(s). If x = ˆ y, Lemma 5.2 implies
that |I(s)| = 1 and therefore aggregate eﬀort is ˆ y, a contradiction. Assume x ∈ (0, ˆ y); from
Lemma 5.1 it follows that yi = ˆ y, ∀i ∈ I(s). Since, by assumption, xi = x, ∀i ∈ I(s), it
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which immediately implies that every positive eﬀort player has the same number of links with
positive eﬀort players; let ∆ be this number. Note that for all i ∈ I(s), yi = x + ∆x = ˆ y,
which implies that x =
ˆ y
∆+1. Since aggregate eﬀort is strictly higher than ˆ y it follows that
∆ < |I(s)| − 1. Also, from Lemma 5.2 we know that x < ˆ y, which implies that ∆ ≥ 1.
Thus, there exists two positive eﬀort players who are neighbors. Since s is equilibrium, then
k ≤ cx. Also, since, by assumption,
P
i∈N xi > ˆ y, there exists two positive eﬀort players who
are not neighbors. Since s is equilibrium, then k ≥ cx. Hence, k = cx. Finally, if I(s) = N,
the proof follows. If not, select j / ∈ I(s). Clearly, in equilibrium no player forms a link with
j. So, in equilibrium j must sponsor ∆+1 links with positive eﬀort players. This concludes
the proof of Part I of Proposition 5.1.
Step 2. Let g0 be the subgraph of g deﬁned on I(s). Let C(¯ g0) be a component ¯ g0. By
construction each player in C(¯ g0) chooses positive eﬀort. Suppose that (A1) total sum of
eﬀorts in C(¯ g0) is strictly higher than ˆ y and (A2) there exists at least a pair of players in
C(¯ g0) who choose a diﬀerent level of eﬀort. The following Lemma is key.
Lemma 5.4 Suppose that (A1) and (A2) holds in C(¯ g0). Then there are two types of players
in C(¯ g0): high eﬀort players choose ¯ x and low eﬀort players choose x < ¯ x. Moreover, every
low eﬀort player forms η links with high eﬀort players, there are not links between low eﬀort
players and k = c¯ x, x = ˆ y − η¯ x and
ˆ yc
k − 1 < η <
ˆ yc
k .
Proof of Lemma 5.4 Without loss of generality label players in C(¯ g0), so that x1 ≥ x2 ≥
... ≥ xm. (A2) implies that there exists l ∈ C(¯ g0), l 6= m, such that xj = xl = ¯ x, for all j ≤ l,
and ¯ x > xl+1. We start by proving two claims.
Claim 1. For all j > l, gji = 1 for some i ≤ l.
To see this, suppose that there exists a j > l such that gji = 0, ∀i ≤ l. This implies that
j does not sponsor links. If, on the contrary, player j sponsors links, then these links are
directed to players j0 > l, but then player j could strictly gain by switching a link from j0 to
some i ≤ l. Note that, it must also be the case that j does not receive any links. Suppose j
24receives a link from a player j0. Then it must be the case that player l is also a j’s neighbor,
otherwise j0 strictly gains by switching the link from j to l. But this says that every player
who sponsors a link to j is a l’s neighbor and since player j only receives links, this means
that player j accesses from his neighbors at most as much eﬀort as player l does. This is in
contradiction with our hypothesis that xj < ¯ x = xl. Hence, claim 1 follows.
Claim 2. There exists some i,i0 ≤ l such that ¯ gii0 = 0.
Suppose not; then {1,..,l} is a clique. This implies that for all i ≤ l, there exists at least a
player j > l such that ¯ gij = 0. If not, i would access everyone and from A1 it follows that
yi > ˆ y, which contradicts Lemma 5.1. Next, select such a player j. Clearly, gjj0 = 0 for all
j0 > l, otherwise j strictly gains by switching the link from j0 to i. Analogously, if j receives
a link from some j0 > l, then also i must be a neighbor of j0. Therefore, since {1,..,l} is
a clique, it follows that every neighbor of j is also a i’s neighbor, and this contradicts the
assumption that xj < ¯ x. Hence, claim 2 follows.
We can now conclude the proof of Lemma 5.4. First note that an implication of claim 1 and
claim 2 is that k = c¯ x. Indeed, from claim 1 we know that there exists a player j > l who
sponsors a link to a player i ≤ l. Since s is equilibrium, this implies that k ≤ c¯ x. Similarly,
claim 2 implies that there exists i,i0 ≤ l such that ¯ gii0 = 0; since s is an equilibrium this
implies that k ≥ c¯ x. Hence, k = c¯ x.
Next, since k = c¯ x and xj < ¯ x for all j > l, it follows that ¯ gj0j = 0 for all j > l. Therefore,
every player j > l forms only links with players in {1,..,l}. We now show that xj = xj+1
for all j > l. Select j > l and assume that xj > xj+1. Then, yj = xj + ηj(g)¯ x and
yj+1 = xj+1 + ηj+1(g)¯ x. Lemma 5.1 implies that yj = yj+1 = ˆ y, which holds whenever
xj − xj+1 = (ηj+1 − ηj)¯ x. Since xj > xj+1, then ηj+1 − ηj ≥ 1, but then (ηj+1 − ηj)¯ x ≥ ¯ x >
xj−xj+1, where the last inequality follows because, by assumption, xj < ¯ x. Thus, all players
j > l chooses the same eﬀort, say x, and from Lemma 5.1 it follows that x + ηj(g)¯ x = ˆ y.
Thus, every low eﬀort player sponsors the same number of links with high eﬀort players, say
η, and x + η¯ x = ˆ y. This concludes the proof of Lemma 5.4. 
25We now conclude the proof. Recall that g0 is the subgraph of g deﬁned on positive eﬀorts
players. We need to consider two cases: one, ¯ g0 is connected, and two ¯ g0 is not connected.
One, if ¯ g0 is connected, then (A1) holds by assumption. If (A2) does not hold then step 1
applies and the proof follows. If (A2) holds then Lemma 5.4 applies. We then need to show
that every player must choose positive eﬀort. To see this note that since k = c¯ x every player
j / ∈ I(s) will only sponsor links to high eﬀort players. Then, by symmetry, low eﬀort players
must obtain the same payoﬀs of players j / ∈ I(s). It is easy to check that this is possible if
and only if x = ¯ x, which contradicts (A2).
Two, suppose g0 is not connected and let C1 and C2 be two arbitrary components. Here, note
that for every i,i0 ∈ C1 and j,j0 ∈ C2 such that gi,i0 = gj,j0 = 1, then x0
i = x0
j = x ≥ xi,xj
and k = cx. Indeed, x0
i = x0
j = x follows because, if x0
i < x0
j then player i would strictly gain
by switching a link from i0 to j0; for analogous reasonings it follows that xi,xj ≤ x; k = cx
follows because i sponsors a link to i0, thus k ≤ cx, and i0 does not sponsor a link to j0, thus
k ≥ cx. Together, these observations imply that every player who receives a link in C1 and
every player who receives a link in C2 chooses eﬀort x. Thus, if in C1 and C2 every player
receives at least a link, positive eﬀorts players choose the same eﬀort and the proof follows
from step 1. Suppose in C1 some player does not receive a link and eﬀort is not homogeneous
across players. If the aggregate eﬀort in C1 equals ˆ y, then C1 is a clique and therefore at
most one player can only sponsor links. Since C1 is a clique and aggregate eﬀort is ˆ y, this
player will choose x = ˆ y − (|C1| − 1)x. Alternatively, if in C1 the aggregate eﬀort is higher
than 1, then lemma 5.4 applies. Similar considerations hold for any other components. The
proof of Proposition 5.1 now follows from the combination of these observations. 
Appendix B.
This appendix provides proﬀs of the results in section 4.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: We start with Part I. Suppose s satisﬁes the condition in the
proposition. Take a player i; since
P
j∈N xj = ˆ y, ¯ g is minimally connected, and al = 1 for all
ﬁnite l, then yi = ˆ y, so player i does not want to change his own eﬀort level and also he does
not want to form an additional link. The payoﬀs to i at equilibrium s are f(ˆ y)−cxi −ηi(g).
26If ηi(g) = 0, then player i plays a best reply. Suppose ηi(g) > 0, then gi,j = 1 for some j.
Note that player i is indiﬀerent between keeping the link with j and switching the link from
j to a player that i accessed via j. So, the only possible deviation to check is that player
i deletes the link with j; since k ≤ cyj player i does not gain by doing so. Hence, s is an
equilibrium.
We now prove the reverse. Let s = (x,g) be an equilibrium. Since al = 1 for all ﬁnite l, then,
in equilibrium, every component of ¯ g must be minimal. Also, the aggregate eﬀort in each
component must be ˆ y. If not, then a positive eﬀort player strictly gains by either increasing
his own eﬀort (if aggregate eﬀort is lower than ˆ y) or decreasing his own eﬀort (if aggregate
eﬀort is higher than ˆ y). Next, suppose ¯ g is not connected. Let C1 be a component of ¯ g; note
that it cannot be the case that a player i ∈ C1 chooses xi = ˆ y. Suppose, on the contrary,
that xi = ˆ y, then all i’s neighbors choose eﬀort 0 and sponsors a link to i, so i’s payoﬀs are
f(ˆ y) − cˆ y, but, since k < cˆ y, player i strictly gains if he chooses 0 and forms a link with a
player j ∈ C2. Thus, in C1 there are at least two players choosing positive eﬀort; moreover,
since C1 is minimal it must be the case that at least a player who chooses positive eﬀort also
sponsors a link. So let gjj0 = 1, j,j0 ∈ C1 and xj ∈ (0, ˆ y). Then, since
P
j∈N xj = ˆ y, y0
j < ˆ y
and therefore player j strictly gains by switching the link from j0 to a player j00 belonging to
a diﬀerent component. Thus, ¯ g is connected. Finally, it is readily seen that if gij = 1 and
s is equilibrium, then k ≤ cyj. It is not easy to conclude the proof of Part I of Proposition
4.1. It is easy to verify Part II of Proposition 4.1. This concludes the proof of Proposition
4.1 
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Suppose k < c and let s = (x,g) be an equilibrium. We claim
that there exists an i ∈ N such that xi = 1 and that xj = 0, ∀j 6= i. First, since k < c, there
must be at least a player who chooses eﬀort 1. Second, suppose both i and j choose eﬀort
1. Then, it must be the case that xi0 = 0, ∀i0 ∈ N(i; ¯ g); for if a neighbor of i chooses eﬀort
1, player i strictly gains by choosing eﬀort 0. Since xi0 = 0, ∀i0 ∈ N(i; ¯ g), then gil = 0 for
all l. Hence, player i’s payoﬀs in equilibrium s are 1 − c. If player i chooses 0 and forms a
link with j then he obtains 1 − k. Since k < c, 1 − k > 1 − c and therefore s cannot be an
equilibrium. Next, let xi = 1 and xj = 0, ∀j 6= i. Trivially, gj0j = 0, ∀j0 ∈ N, j 6= i, and,
27since k < c, every player j 6= i has a link with i. This completes the proof for the case k < c.
The proof for the case k > c is trivial and therefore omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Suppose k < c and suppose that s = (x,g) is eﬃcient. It is
easy to see that the only links in g are between pair of players (i,j) with xi 6= xj. Also, if
player i chooses 0 then player i has only one link with a player choosing 1. Indeed, if player i
had two distinct links with two players choosing 1, then welfare can be made strictly higher
by deleting one of the link. Hence, the total number of links are (n − m), where m is the
number of players choosing 1, and each player gets returns of 1. Then the social welfare is
n − mc − (n − m)k. If k > c, this expression decreases with m and therefore m = 1, which
implies the result. Suppose now that k > c. The above arguments show that if there are
m < n players choosing 1, and s is eﬃcient then the social welfare is n−mc−(n−m)k, but
then welfare can be increased by setting m = n, which implies the result. This concludes
the proof. 
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Figure 1. xi,xj,xl>0, xl>xj
31Figure 2. Inter-linked stars architecture with three 
hubs, n=8.
32Figure 3. Inter-linked stars architectures, 
n=8
Inter-linked stars architectures with 3 hubs. Inter-linked stars architectures with 2 hubs.










Figure 4. Trade-off: Efficient Outcomes 
and Equilibrium Outcomes
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